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








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PH. D. VALENTÍN KITANOV





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THE UNSHARED ROAD OF CONFLICT OR ONE WAR LESS IN THE BALKANS (HISTORICAL READING OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE PRINCIPALITY OF BULGARIA OF 1904)

EL CAMINO NO COMPARTIDO DEL CONFLICTO O UNA GUERRA MENOS EN LOS BALCANES. (LA LECTURA HISTÓRICA DEL ACUERDO ENTRE EL IMPERIO OTOMANO Y EL PRINCIPADO DE BULGARIA EN 1904)

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Resumen

En 1903, El Imperio Otomano y El Principado de Bulgaria se enfrentan al riesgo de un conflicto militar entre ellos. Éste conflicto es provocado por la tensión en la "cuestión Macedonia". Gracias a las actividades diplomáticas de ambos países, la tensión es superada y la colisión militar quda paralizada. El mérito principal de etas negociaciones lo tienen por el lado búlgaro Grigor Nachovich, agente diplomático en Constantinopla y por el lado turco, Zeki Pasha, un ayudante del Sultán otomano y jefe de artillería junto a Sayid Pasha, presidente del Consejo de Estado. El acuerdo búlgaro-turco fue firmado el 26 de marzo de 1904 e incluye los compromisos para ambos países de las propuestas de la diplomacia europea. El acuerdo es aprobado por los "grandes poderes", que aspiran no alterar el status quo en los Balcanes en este momento.

Palabras Claves

"La custión de Macedonia – IMRO – Acuerdo Búlgaro-Turco – Grandes potencias – Diplomacia europea Península de los Balcanes – Principado de Bulgaria

Abstract

In 1903 the Ottoman Empire and the Principality of Bulgaria were facing the danger of the outburst of a military conflict between them. It arose from the escalation of tension concerning the Macedonian Question. Thanks to the diplomatic activities of the two countries, the tension was overcome and the military conflict was prevented. The major merit for such outcome belonged to the diplomatic agent in Tsarigrad Grigor Nachovich from the Bulgarian side and from the Ottoman side - Zeki Pasha, an adjutant to the Ottoman sultan and head of the artillery and Said Pasha, chairman of the State Council. The Bulgarian – Turkish agreement was signed on 26 March 1904 and it included commitments for both countries in line with the positions of European diplomacy. The agreement met the approval of the great powers, which strove not to destroy the status-quo at that moment.

Keywords

Macedonian Question – IMARo – Bulgarian-Turkish Agreement – Great powers – European diplomacy Balkan Peninsula – Principality of Bulgaria

Introduction

The last decades from the existence of the Ottoman Empire were rich in historical events, social transformation and political dynamics that changed the government and political scene in South-eastern Europe. The affirmation of young nations and the building up of their states was concurrent with the gradual but irreversible withdrawal of the sultan empire from the historical scene. That new paradigm on the Balkans that originated during the first half of the XIX-th century was legitimized at the Berlin Congress and by the agreement entered into there. Nationalism proved to be much more viable and historically justified compared to Pan-Islamism of Sultan Abdul Hamid II, the federalism of Balkan Slavs or the Ottomanism of the Young Turks. The conflict between the ottoman past and the European perspective is an emanation of the Balkan everyday life throughout a prolonged, complex period filled with twists and turns and difficult decisions. It was a time when wars, liberation events and revolutionary terrorism live together with diplomatic and inter-state initiatives, political projects and cultural propaganda.

The Berlin Treaty paved the way for the final stage of development of the Eastern Question. It created one of the main problems that engaged the efforts and attention of the great powers up to the First World War – the Macedonian Question. The Macedonian Question refers directly to the status of the European ottoman provinces of Macedonia and Eastern Thrace and turned into a complex knot of controversies between the Balkan governments. They tried to implement their own national-government projects dictated by historical, geopolitical or popular prerequisites and ambitions. The political leaders often used force. Armed conflict or military confrontation was the form they preferred to use for solving the disputes occurring. That was also the most suitable space for historical rematch and making modern heroics. The new nations and state excellently realized that the era of military-political domination of the Ottoman Empire in the European southeast belonged to the past.

In 1893 in the main city of the ottoman province of Macedonia – Thessaloniki a revolutionary committee was founded and it became famous in history with its later name – Internal Macedonian Adrianopolitan Revolutionary Organization (IMARO).² The

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¹ Pursuant to the clauses of the Berlin Treaty of 1878, Serbia, Montenegro and Romania received state independence. An autonomous and tributary Principality of Bulgaria was established under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire sultan and an autonomous province Eastern Rumelia. Macedonia and Adrianopolitan /Eastern/ Thrace remained an integral part of the Ottoman Empire. See the treaty's text in: E. Hertslet. The Map of Europe by Treaty; Showing the various political and territorial changes, which have taken place since the general peace of 1814. With numerous maps and notes, London, vol. IV (1875-1891), p. 2759-98. Б.Кесяков. Принос към дипломатическата история на България (1878-1925), т. 1, София, 1925, с. 1(В. Кезуакоv. Contribution to the diplomatic history of Bulgaria (1878-1925), volume 1, Sofia, 1925, р. 1). Г. П. Генов. Международни актове и договори, засягащи България с обяснителни бележки и една карта на България и съседните страни. Годишник на Софийския университет, юридически факултет, т. XXXIV, I, 1938/1939, София, 1940, с. 275

⁽G. P. Genov. International Acts and Treaties Affecting Bulgaria with Explanatory Notes and a Map of Bulgaria and Neighboring Countries. Annual collection of Sofia University, Law Faculty, volume XXXIV, I, 1938/1939, Sofia, 1940, p. 275).

² This name of the organization was accepted for the first time on its First Rila General Congress in 1905. Until then the organization was known as the Macedonian Revolutionary Committees /MRC/, Secret Macedonian-Adrianopolitan Revolutionary Organization /SMARO/. For the founding and initial development of the organization, see Xp. Силянов. Освободителните борби на

organization formulated as a goal of the liberation movement Macedonia's and Eastern Thrace's autonomy. That radicalized the Macedonian Question and raised it for solution with all its complexity before the Sublime Porte, the Balkan states and international factors. The Principality of Bulgaria engaged with the problem in the long run in view of the national characteristic of the revolutionary movement and the significant presence of Bulgarian in the ethnical, social and economic characteristics of a number of parts of both ottoman provinces.

Purpose of the research

The author has set as his purpose in the present research on the grounds of materials from authentic sources and the historical literature available on the issue to reveal the place of the Bulgarian-Turkish agreement of 1904 in the development of the Macedonian Question. The purpose has been accomplished by solving a number of problems, placing a special emphasis on the role of Bulgarian, Ottoman and European diplomacy in the efforts to prevent as military conflict on the Balkans.

Crisis in the relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Principality of Bulgaria on the Macedonian question

Bulgarian-Turkish relations played an important part in the process of transforming the European ottoman heritage into the modern state and political system in the Balkans and that can be traced back quite distinctly in the period 1878-1913. The tension between the vassal and suzerain often violated the normal rhythm of diplomatic relations and in some cases reached critical dimensions. In 1903, a similar situation occurred and it was related to the Ilinden-Preobrazhenie Uprising. It was organized and conducted by IMARO and was interpreted by the empire as intervention of the Principality of Bulgaria in its internal affairs. The Sublime Porte exercised serious efforts and succeeded in spreading among international factors the idea of the Principality as the initiator of the revolutionary events in the Balkan vilayets or communities. Ottoman diplomats commissioned to the capitals of the European great powers received special instructions to undertake the relevant diplomatic manoeuvers to compromise Bulgaria³.

Македония. Фототипно издание. Т. 1, София, 1983. (Hr. Silyanov. The Liberation Struggles of Macedonia. Phototype edition. v. 1, Sofia, 1983). Duncan Perry. The Politics of Terror. The Macedonian Liberation Movements 1893-1903. Durham and London, 1988. К. Пандев. Националноосвободителното движение в Македония и Одринско 1878-1903, София, 2000 К. (Pandev. The National Liberation Movement in Macedonia and in Adrianople Region, 1878-1903, Sofia, 2000). Вътрешната македоно-одринска революционна организация през погледа на нейните основатели. Спомени на Дамян Груев, д-р Христо Татарчев, Иван Хаджиниколов, Андон Димитров, Петър Попарсов. Съставителство, предговор и бележки Тодор Петров, Цочо Билярски. София, 2002. (The Internal Macedonian Adrianopolitan Revolutionary Organisation through the Viewpoint of its Founders. Memories of Damyan Gruev, Dr. Hristo Tatarchev, Ivan Hadzhinikolov, Andon Dimitrov, Petar Poparsov. Compilation, preface and notes by Todor Petrov, Tsocho Bilyarski. Sofia, 2002).

³ Из тайния архив на българския цар Фердинанд I. Документи за военната и политическата история на България, София, 2001, с. 31-45. (From the Secret Archives of the Bulgarian King Ferdinand I. Documents about the Military and Political History of Bulgaria, Sofia, 2001, pp. 31-45).

The two countries were facing the danger of outburst of military confrontation between them for the second time after the Unification of the Principality of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia in 1885. The Ottoman Empire mobilized military troops and this provoked similar response measures on behalf of Bulgarian armed forces⁴.

The escalation of tension between the Principality and the Sublime Porte was probably anticipated because one year earlier on 31 May 1902, in Petersburg Bulgaria signed with Russia a convention of military cooperation and mutual assistance⁵. Russia, however, was against Bulgarian intervention in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire. Petersburg officially warned Sofia it will bear all consequences in the event of open support of the IMARO activities⁶. The main reason for that was the unwillingness of the Russian state to change the status-quo in the Balkans. The other European governments shared a similar opinion. They reviewed the activities of the revolutionary organization on the preparation of an uprising as political pressure to provoke European intervention in favour of the autonomy of Macedonia and the Adrianople regions⁷.

As a whole, the great powers did not support the intensification of inter-state relations in the Balkans at that time. That situation predetermined the political and diplomatic lack of popularity of an eventual military conflict between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire. Direct negotiations started between the two states to enter into an agreement. The Ottoman Empire would try to avoid intervention of the great powers in its affairs, while Bulgaria would strive to affirm its position of main defender of its compatriots in Macedonia and Adrianople.

Bulgarian Prince Ferdinand I was the first to undertake steps in that direction and at his insistence the famous politician and diplomat Grigor Nachovich departed to the Ottoman capital.⁸ In the period from 15 to 31 May 1903 G. Nachovich succeeded in

⁴ Ел. Стателова, Р. Попов, В. Танкова. История на българската дипломация 1879-1913 г. София, 1994, с. 292-293. (El. Statelova, R. Popov, V. Tankova. History of Bulgarian Diplomacy 1879-1913. Sofia, 1994, pp. 292-293).

⁵ From the Secret Archives of the Bulgarian king Ferdinand I. Sofia, pp. 8-10.

⁶ ЦДА (Централен държавен архив), ф. 3к, оп. 8, а.е. 531, л. 52-53. Препис на руски език. Ръкопис. (CSA (Central State Archive), fond 3c, inventory 8, archival file 531, pp. 52-53). Transcript in Russian. Manuscript. Китанов, Принос към дипломатическата история на България. Григор Начович и Българо-турското споразумение от 1904 г. Документален сборник. София, 2004, с. 32. (V. Kitanov, Contribution to the Diplomatic History of Bulgaria. Grigor Nachovich and the Bulgarian-Turkish Agreement of 1904. Documentary collection. Sofia, 2004, p. 32).

⁷ С. Дамянов. Великите сили и националноосвободителната борба в Македония и Одринско през 1903 г.-В: Осемдесет години Илинденско-Преображенско въстание. Изд. На БАН, София, 1988, с. 94-95. (S. Damyanov. The Great Powers and the National Liberation Struggle in Macedonia and Adrianople in 1903.-In: Eighty Years from the Ilinden-Preobrazhenie Uprising. Ed. BAS, Sofia, 1988, pp. 94-95).

⁸ From the memories left and the book of his contemporaries it is evident that the evaluations of Grigor Nachovich were not very flattering. But from the documentation preserved and from the results of his activity it becomes clear that he was an extremely responsible diplomat. See. Вж. С. Радев. Строителите на съвременна България, София, 1990, т. І, с. 173. (S. Radev. Th Builders of Modern Bulgaria, Sofia, 1990, v. І, р. 173). С. С. Бобчев. Григорий Д. Начевич, Летопис на Българската академия на науките, V. за години 1918, 1919 и 1920. София, 1922, с. 93 – 108. (S. S. Bobchev. Grigoriy D. Nachovich, Chronicle of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, V. for the years 1918, 1919 and 1920. Sofia, 1922, pp. 93 – 108). И. Мусаков. Григор Начевич, София, 1944, 151 с. (I. Musakov. Grigor Nachevich, Sofia, 1944, 151 р.). Т. Васильов. Спомени за лица и събития, София, 2001, с. 55. (T. Vasilyov. Memories of Faces and Events, Sofia, 2001,

conducting important meetings consecutively with Tasim pasha, the first secretary of the Ottoman sultan, with the Grand Vizier Ferid Pasha, with the Russian ambassador Zinoviev, with the Austrian-Hungarian ambassador Kaliche, with the French ambassador Consante, with the English one O'Connor, with the Italian one Malaspina, with the former Ottoman commissioner in Sofia Nedzhip Efendi Melhame, and, of course with the sultan Abdul Hamid II. Nachovich was assigned with the task to work for the returning of mutual trust between the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria. The main purpose was to avoid the danger of military conflict between the two states. The Bulgarian diplomat insisted to introduce reforms in Macedonia and to liberate the Bulgarian people arrested for political reasons. He had to dispel the doubts in Ottoman political circles that Bulgaria was behind the revolutionary movement in Macedonia and Adrianople region⁹. In his activities Nachovich also had to take into account the fact that the first serious steps to establish long-lasting political contacts between the Sublime Porte and IMARO had been taken, aiming at reaching an agreement between them concerning the Macedonian Problem.¹⁰

The established contacts and mutual declarations made by the two governments did not stop the Ottoman Empire from continuing to gather armed forces along the border with the Principality. Russia and Austria-Hungary carefully monitored the mission of Nachovich and shared their concerns of an eventual outburst of a Bulgarian-Turkish military conflict. At the same time, Russia with whom the Sofia offices did not discuss the mission of Nachovich in advance, was not yet inclined to accept a direct agreement between vassal and suzerain¹¹. Nevertheless, attempt stated to be made for exercising pressure with the purpose to prevent the probably war and that pressure somehow seemed to be more intense on Bulgaria. Germany also demonstrated its interest in avoiding an eventual conflict and Berlin in its turn, exercised stronger pressure on the Ottoman Empire¹². The Sublime Porte excellently knew the situation in its European provinces and suspected that Sofia was not a stranger to the idea of an uprising. It explained the concentration of its armies with the goal to enable the application of reforms by stopping the passing of armed troops from Bulgarian to Ottoman territory¹³.

The presence of ottoman armies at the Bulgarian border and the result of the mission of Nachovich constituted sufficient grounds for the Bulgarian government to come

р. 55). Д. Ганчев. Спомени 1864 — 1887, София, 1939, с. 207, 208 — 209, 217 — 220. (D. Ganchev. Memories 1864 — 1887, Sofia, 1939, р. 5).

⁹ El. Statelova, R. Popov, V. Tankova. History of Bulgarian Diplomacy 1879-1913. Sofia, 1994, pp. 292 – 293.

¹⁰ В. Китанов. Аспекти на политическите отношения на ВМОРО с Турция 1903-1914 г., Благоевград, 2009, с. 37. (V. Kitanov. Aspects of the Political Relations of IMARO with Turkey, 1903-1914, Blagoevgrad, 2009, р. 37).

¹¹ British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914. Vol. V. The Near East. The Macedonian Problem and the Annexation of Bosnia 1903-1908. Edited by G.P.Gooch, and Harold Temperley, London, 1928., p. 58, 104.

¹² Р. Попов. Германия и българо – турските отношения (1902 – 1904), в Studia Balcanica 16, Великите сили и балканските взаимоотношения в края на XIX и началото на XX в., София, 1982, с. 232-233. (R. Popov. Germany and the Bulgarian – Turkish Relations (1902 – 1904), in Studia Balcanica 16, The Great Powers and the Balkan Relations at the End of the XIX-th and the Beginning of the XX-th Century, Sofia, 1982, p. 232-233).

¹³ Попов. Германия и българо – турските отношения... 233; Документи за българската история, т. IV. Документи из турските държавни архиви, ч. II (1863-1909). Подбрал Панчо Дорев. Изд. на БАН (Българска академия на науките), София, 1942 г., с. 203-204. (Documents about Bulgarian History, v. IV. Documents from Turkish State Archives, part II (1863-1909). Selected by Pancho Dorev. Ed. of BAS (Bulgarian Academy of Science), Sofia, 1942, p. 203-204).

up with a formal note of 16/29 June 1903 addressed to the governments of Russia, Austria-Hungary and France. It explicitly emphasized on the efforts of the Bulgarian state to come to an agreement concerning the Macedonian Question and the disappointment that the Sublime Porte demonstrated its unwillingness to conduct serious negotiations¹⁴. The Sofia government offices explained their activities as dictated by the common interests of the Principality and the Empire. He suggested to the Ottoman government his cooperation for reaching peace and understanding between the two states. Bulgaria insisted that the persecutions which the population in Macedonia and Adrianople Thrace was subjected to termination should be terminated and that population should be guaranteed better life by applying adequate reforms¹⁵.

The diplomatic stir did not help to de-escalate the tension. There was hardly a change in the situation of Bulgarians from the two vilayets either. The uprising planned by IMARO burst out on 2 August 1903. The rebel actions continues until the autumn of the same year when the uprising was suppressed. Its consequences were expressed in a

¹⁴ Освободителната борба на българите в Македония и Одринско 1902 – 1904. Дипломатически документи, София, 1978, с. 231-234. (The Struggle of Liberation of Bulgarians in Macedonia and Adrianople 1902 – 1904. Diplomatic Documents, Sofia, 1978, p. 231-234).

¹⁵ Освободителната борба на българите в Македония и Одринско... 233.

¹⁶ In relation to the uprising see the following summary research and documentary publications: A. Томов. Г. Баждаров. Революционната борба в Македония. София. 1918. Хр. Силянов. Освободителните борби на Македония, Т. І. Н. Спиров. Преображенското въстание. София, 1965. Г. Георгиев, Й. Шопов. Илинденското въстание. София, 1969. Л. Данаилов, Ст. Нойков. Националноосвободителното движение в Тракия 1878 – 1903. София, 1971. Л. Панайотов. Илинденско-Преображенско въстание 1903. София, 1983; История на България. Т. 7 (1878 – 1903), София, 1991. Националноосвободителното движение на македонските и тракийските българи 1878 – 1944. Т. 2, София, 1995. Македония. История и политическа съдба. Т. І, София, 1994. Илинденско-Преображенското въстание от 1903 г. Военна подготовка и провеждане. София. 1992. Материали за историята на македонското освободително движение. Кн. 1 – 11, София, 1925 – 1931. Ив. Орманджиев. Приноси към историята на въстаническото движение в Одринско (1896 – 1903). Кн. 1 – 4, София – Бургас, 1927 – 1941. Ив. П. Горов. Документи за македоно-одринското революционно движение и за Преображенското въстание. Преображенско въстание 1903. София, 1955, с. 233 – 234. Македония. Сборник от документи и материали. София, 1978, с. 426 - 427. Михаил Герджиков. Спомени, документи, материали. София, 1984. Д-р Христо Татарчев. Спомени, документи, материали. София, 1989. Даме Груев. Спомени, кореспонденция. София, 1999. 36 години във ВМРО. Спомени на Кирил Пърличев. София, 1999 и др. (A. Tomov, G. Bazhdarov. The Revolutionary Struggle in Macedonia. Sofia, 1918. Hr. Silyanov. Liberation Struggles of Macedonia, V. I. N. Spirov. Preobrazhenie Uprising. Sofia, 1965. G. Georgiev, Y. Shopov. The Ilinden Uprising. Sofia, 1969. L. Danailov, St. Noykov. The National Liberation Movement in Thrace in 1878 - 1903. Sofia, 1971. L. Panayotov. Ilinden-Preobrazhenie Uprising 1903. Sofia, 1983. History of Bulgaria. V. 7 (1878 - 1903), Sofia, 1991. The national Liberation Movement of Macedonian and Thracian Bulgarians 1878 - 1944. T. 2, Sofia, 1995. Macedonia. History and Political Fate. V. I, Sofia, 1994. The Ilinden-Preobrazhenie Uprising of 1903. Military Preparation and Conducting. Sofia, 1992. Materials on the History of Macedonian Movement for Liberation. Book 1 - 11. Sofia, 1925 - 1931. Iv. Ormanszhiev. Contributions to the History of Uprising Movement in Adrianople Region (1896 - 1903). Book 1 - 4, Sofia - Burgas, 1927 - 1941. Iv. P. Gorov. Documents on the Macedonian - Adrianople Revolutionary Movement and on the Preobrazhenie Uprising. Preobrazhenie Uprising 1903. Sofia, 1955, p. 233 – 234. Macedonia. Collection of Documents and Materials. Sofia, 1978, p. 426 - 427. Mihail Gerzhikov. Memories, Documents, Materials. Sofia, 1984. Dr. Hristo Tatarchev. Memories, Documents, Materials. Sofia, 1989. Dame Gruev. Memories, Correspondence. Sofia, 1999. 36 years in IMARO. Memories of Kiril Parlichev. Sofia, 1999, etc).

large number of victims, disrupted social and economic life, refugee rush towards Bulgaria and the exile of several thousand people to various locations in the empire.

The tension between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire in relation to the Macedonian Question did not drop and the threat of war beginning remained. It was then obvious more than never before that diplomatic effort to prevent the military conflict should not stop. That was especially true for the Bulgarian side because after the uprising the situation in the Balkans changed in a direction negative for Sofia. Serbia and Greece switched from educational to military propaganda in Macedonia. They practically declared war on the revolutionary movement in the region¹⁷. Those two countries also got support for that from the official ottoman power before the uprising itself. For example, in February 1903 sultan Abdul Hamid II issued an order to offer all kinds of facilitation to Greeks in the empire. That decision was taken following a proposal on behalf of the Ottoman plenipotentiary minister in Athens. According to him the Ottoman Empire should show its benevolence to countries, which are not trying at that moment to change the status-quo in the Balkan territories of the empire.¹⁸

The hard way of negotiations

On September 20, 1903 the credential letter of Grigor Nachovich from Prince Ferdinand to sultan Abdul Hamid II concerning his appointment as Bulgarian diplomatic agent in the Ottoman capital replacing Iv. St. Geshov. Nachovich was the most suitable candidate for that position in a period when the Principality was in a difficult international position. He was already familiar to the political and diplomatic elite in Tsarigrad after his mission from May 1903 as a moderate, dialogical, erudite personality with statesmanlike thinking who did not accept revolutionary radicalism as a means of accomplishing political goals.

During the days when Nachovich was getting ready to depart for his diplomatic appointment to Tsarigrad, the two great powers with major interest in the situation in the Balkans – Russia and Austria-Hungary – drew up the next project for reforms in Macedonia. The Reforms from Murzsteg were developed on 17 September 1903 and on 11 November 1903 the ottoman sultan gave his consent for their application.²⁰

¹⁷ H. Brailsford. Macedonia. Its Races and Their Future, London, 1906, р. 122. Св. Елдъров. Сръбската въоръжена пропаганда в Македония (1901-1912). София, 1993, с. 72 и сл. (Sv. Eldarov. The Serbian armed Propaganda in Macedonia (1901-1912). Sofia, 1993, р. 72 et seq).

¹⁸ Documents about Bulgarian History, v. IV. Documents from the Turkish State Archives. P. II (1863-1909), p. 191.

¹⁹ CSA, fond 3 c, inventory 8, archival file 420, pp. 1-2.

²⁰ The act of reform was drawn up by the foreign ministers of Russia and Austria-Hungary – Count Vladimir Lamsdorf and count Agenor Goluchowski who met in the hunting castle of emperor Franz Joseph in the small town of Murzsteg, province of Styria. The act was given to the Sublime Porte on 10 October 1903 but initially rejected by the Ottoman party on 28 October. After long-lasting pressure by the importing parties and by the other European great powers, Abdul Hamid II gave his consent for its application by preserving the right to negotiate on the details. The text of the Murzsteg Reforms see in: Livre Jaune. Affaires de Macedoine (1903-1905), Paris, 1905, 40, Аплехе. Вritish Documents on the Origins of the War.., 65-66. Хр. Силянов. Освободителните борби на Македония. Т. II. След Илинденското въстание, София, 1943, с. 42-43. (Hr. Silyanov. The liberation struggles of Macedonia. V. II. After the Ilinden Uprising, Sofia, 1943, p. 42-43)

The Murzsteg Program of reforms united the reformation demands of Vienna and Petersburg in nine points. The basic issue that had to be solved with the reform application was the reorganization of Ottoman gendarmerie in the Macedonian vilayets – Thesaloniki, Bitola and Kosovo one. For that purpose, one foreign general and some foreign officers were appointed on behalf of the great powers, combined vilayet commissions and participation of local Christians in the subdivisions. The reform act did not affect Adrianople region.²¹

The Murzsteg project for reforms in European Turkey was another attempted intervention of the great powers in the empire's internal affairs. It was accepted with reserves both by the Ottoman sultan and by the Bulgarian government. The principality was not pleased with the fact that Bulgarian interests were not taken into account and complete and immediate amnesty was not proposed. Sofia was also disappointed with the fact that, no control body was envisaged for the Ottoman authorities applying the reforms, in case their actions are not in coordination with the chief inspector and the civilian agents²². The Ottoman arguments were of totally different nature. Imposing the reforms by the great powers was viewed by the sultan as a violation of the sovereignty of the Ottoman state. That situation further encouraged the willingness to conduct direct negotiations between the suzerain and the vassal.

The negotiations between the two governments initially progressed with difficulty because the empire did not demonstrate any readiness to compromise, especially in relation to the issues concerning Adrianople. Regardless of that, Nachovich made several attempts before the Grand Vizier Ferid Pasha and before the official negotiator on behalf of the Ottoman side, Zeki Pasha to achieve at least a promise to include that region in the agreement. The empire was not prone to compromise in relation to the issue of Adrianople and as a whole it was attempting to procrastinate the negotiations. That behaviour was the result of the clear understanding of the difficult international position Bulgaria was in after the Ilinden-Preobrazhenie Uprising. Ottoman diplomacy was aware of the concerns of the cabinet council in Sofia related to a possible cooling of relations with Russia. The Sublime Porte also knew about the insistence from Vienna to request clear signals that the

М. Лалков. Мюрцщегската реформена програма 1903 – 1908 г. в Национално – освободителното движение на македонските и тракийските българи 1878 – 1944. Т. 3. София. 1997, c. 12. (M. Lalkov. Murzsteg Reform Programme 1903 – 1908 in national liberation movement of Macedonian and Thracian Bulgarians 1878 - 1944. V. 3, Sofia, 1997, p. 12). (According to the author, the political development of the ottoman empire throughout the following years led to a failure of the reform deed. Among the great powers no agreement or joint actions could be reached concerning a number of important issues, in relation to Macedonia and the reformation of European Turkey, see p. 23). A. Rappoport, a long-year consular officer of Austria-Hungary in Macedonia believed that the controversial actions of foreign representatives were the main reason for the failure of the reforms. See: A. Rappoport. Au pays des martyrs. Notes et souvenirs d'un ancient concul general d'Autrishe-Hongrie en Macedoine (1904-1909), Paris, 1927, 27. On this issue, see also: Xp. Андонов-Полјански, Ситуацијата во Македонија по Илинденското востание и Мюрцштегските реформи. - Годишен зборник на Филозофскиот факултет на Универзитетот во Скопје, Историско-филолошкиоддел, го./VIII, кн. 1, Скопје, 1955, с. 5-58. (Hr. Andonov-Poljansky, The situation in Macedonia after the Ilinden uprising and the Mürzsteg reforms. -An annual volume at the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Skopie. Historical-philological department, V. / VIII, 1, Skopje, 1955, р. 5-58). Гл. Тодоровски. Реформите на големите европски сили во Македонија (1829-1909), I и II, Скопје, 1984. (Gl. Todorovski. The reforms of the major European powers in Macedonia (1829-1909), I and II, Skopje, 1984). ²² British Documents on the Origins of the War...107.

Principality would not support the Macedonian-Adrianople revolutionary movement²³. Bulgarian perseverance met Ottoman opposition and the negotiations were facing the clear risk of termination. During their conclusive phase the interference of the German ambassador in Tsarigrad, baron Marshal was especially effective ²⁴.

During the last days of February, Nachovich sought the support of Prince Ferdinand but the prince hesitated in giving his consent to conclude the agreement ²⁵. The intransigence of both states concerning the Adrianople vilayet led the negotiations to a deadlock. Nachovich realized he was unable to influence the prince or the Prime Minister Gen. Racho Petrov by writing, that is why he left for Sofia for instructions ²⁶. The information about that trip is scares but the results were a fact. Nachovich succeeded in convincing the Bulgarian prince and prime-minister in the necessity of the agreement and soon after his returning to Tsarigrad, on 26 March 1904 that agreement was signed. Gr. Nachovich signed on behalf of the Bulgarian state and Said Pasha – Chairman of the State Council, signed on behalf of the Ottoman empire along with Zeki Pasha – adjutant of the sultan and head of the²⁷.

The Bulgarian-Turkish agreement and overcoming the danger of military conflict on the Balkans

The agreement consists of eight points and they pertain to the solution of problems arising from the escalation of tension between the states. The first two points formulated the specific commitments of the Bulgarian principality related to the Macedonian Question. First of all, it was obligated "to prevent on its territory, as well as in Eastern Rumelia, the formation of revolutionary committees and armed bands as well as all activities aimed at bringing of turmoil into the Empire". The principality had to treat similar events as illegal actions. It had to punish every attempt for anti-state actions performed by Bulgarian residents in Macedonia and Adrianopolitan Thrace specified in the text as "the neighbouring provinces". Another commitment of the Principality was determined by the content of the second item. According to it the Bulgarian party promised to "take the

²³ Documents diplomatiques Français, II. 1901-1911, 4, Paris, 1932, 121 (Report of the French charge d'affaires in Sanct Petersburg Butiron to the minister of foreign affairs Delcasse of 21 November 1903). 199 (Report of the head of the French diplomatic mission in Sofia Burgarel to the minister of foreign affairs Delcasse of 23 December 1903).

²⁴ R. Popov. Germany and the Bulgarian-Turkish Relations (1902-1904). p. 246-251.

²⁵ CSA, fond 3к, inventory 8, archival file 597, p. 16, p.18. Telegrams from Prince Ferdinand to Gr. Nachovich. Sofia, 10 and 11 March 1904. Т. Влахов. Криза в българо-турските отношения 1895-1908, София, 1977, с. 75, 89-90. (T. Vlahov. Crisis in Bulgarian-Turkish Relations 1895-1908, Sofia, 1977, p. 75, pp. 89-90).

²⁶ T. Vlahov. Crisis in Bulgarian-Turkish Relations... 90.

²⁷ The text of the Bulgarian-Turkish Agreement see in: Д-р Б. Кесяков. Принос към дипломатическата история на България 1878-1925. С предговор от проф. Ст. Баламезов, София, 1925, с. 22-24. (Dr. B. Kesyakov. Contribution to the Diplomatic History of Bulgaria 1878-1925. With e preface by Prof. St. Balemezov, Sofia, 1925, pp. 22-24). Documents diplomatiques Francais, II. 1901-1911, 5, Paris, 1934,. 6-8 (In a report of the French charge d'affaires in Tsarigrad Barst to the minister of foreign affairs Delcasse of 28 March/10 April/ the full text of the Bulgarian-Turkish Agreement is enclosed). The Struggle for Liberation of Bulgarians in Macedonia and Adrianople Region 1902-1904, pp. 554-557. В. Китанов. Принос към дипломатическата история на България. Григор Начович и Българо-турското споразумение.., с. 126-127.

⁽V. Kitanov. Contribution to the Diplomatic History of Bulgaria. Grigor Nachovich and the Bulgarian-Turkish Agreement., pp. 126-127).

necessary measures in order to prevent importing into the neighbouring vilayets / i.e. again Macedonia and Adrianople Thrace are envisaged, author's note/ of any explosive or poisonous products". The third and fourth points determine the commitments of the Ottoman concerning the Macedonina Question. It was obligated to activate "the reforms agreed between Turkey, Austria-Hungary and Russia related to the vilayets: Thessaloniki, Bitola, Kosovo". The Sublime Porte promised to give amnesty to the people convicted for revolutionary and political activity except the perpetrators of "dynamite attacks against ships, railway, bridges and government buildings". The Ottoman authorities had to allow to refugees in the Principality to return to their birthplaces in Macedonia and Adrianople Thrace and to guarantee "restoration of their housing and return of their land".

The more important decision in the remaining three points of the agreement pertain to the exchange of deserters and criminals; restoration of normal customs relations and the railway connection between the two countries; free and equal access to civil and court offices in the empire for Bulgarians, etc.

In an additional record the two governments expressed their readiness to conclude special treaties on six different issues of mutual interest:

- on the measures related to provision of the demarcation line security;
- on the regulation of post services, telegraph and permits for travel;
- on the mutual surrender of deserters and criminals together with their weapons and ammunitions;
- on the conditions for local residents subject to military service;
- on the attributes of the relevant commercial agents;
- on the future of the railway connection between the two countries.²⁸

As it is evident from the text of the agreement, the negotiating parties treated each other absolutely equally. It was an exclusive success for the diplomacy of Bulgaria, which, we should not forget, was a vassal principality of the empire. The agreement aimed at normalizing the relations between the two countries and at the same time laid the foundations for the settlement of a number of other issues of mutual interest for the two countries. The Bulgarian-Turkish Agreement is a diplomatic act between suzerain and vassal in a period of state and territorial transformations and rearrangement of the political map in South-Eastern Europe. That is why a more profound look behind the visible part of the text implies the important subjects the two countries are of both parties' interest:

- the role of the great powers in the complex Balkan controversies;
- the complexity of the unsolved Macedonian Question and the danger of its postponement;
- the national contradictions on the peninsula and the future of Ottoman European provinces;
- the difficult path to observing the rules of the relevant nationality and mutual respect:
- state affirmation and political emancipation of the Bulgarian principality;
- the border security, the security of communications and the perspective of political, commercial and economic relations.

²⁸ B. Kesyakov... 22-24. V. Kitanov. Contribution to the Diplomatic History of Bulgaria. Grigor Nachovich and the Bulgarian-Turkish Agreement... 126-127.

European Diplomacy and the Bulgarian-Turkish agreement

Al of this rich palette of problems predetermined the demonstrated interest and active part of European diplomacy in what was happening in the relations between the Bulgarian Principality and the Ottoman Empire. While negotiations were in progress, the diplomatic offices of the great powers presented their positions before the Bulgarian government in relation to the problems in the Balkan in their art concerning the Macedonian Question. According to them, the reasons for complications had to be sought both in the social and political conditions in the Ottoman provinces, and also in the policy of the Bulgarian principality. The successful conclusion of the negotiations and the signing of an agreement was assumed as an essential change in the positive direction. It conformed with the European efforts to establish peace on the peninsula. That evaluation can be traced in the correspondence of Bulgarian diplomatic representatives in European capitals, on the pages of European press and in the behaviour of diplomatic circles in the Ottoman capital.

On 28 January 1904 a formal meeting took place of the Bulgarian diplomatic agent in Vienna Iv. St. Geshov with the Austrian-Hungarian minister of foreign affairs Count Agenor Goluchowski. It became clear that the Austrian state viewed the smoothening of the controversies between Bulgarians and Turks as support to "the peaceful and reformation deed we have undertaken together with Russia". That means that a durable agreement between Bulgariaa and the Ottoman Empire was accepted as an element of the Murzsteg reform programme.²⁹ The evaluation of the Russian foreign minister Count Vladislav Lamsdorf was similar. He stated at the end of February 1904 before the Bulgarian diplomatic agent in Petersburg Dimitar Stanchov that "the agreement will be beneficial for both countries and should be accepted by Bulgaria ".³⁰

The French political circles also expressed serious concern in relation to the crisis between Tsarigrad and Sofia. They were concerned that the commitments of Russia in the war with Japan would make Austria-Hungary more aggressive in terms of Macedonia. A situation like that can encourage the Ottoman side to set forth unacceptable conditions for the Bulgarian government and thus become the cause of military conflict. Paris was definitely against such a scenario. That was the assessment made by the Bulgarian diplomatic agent in the French capital Lyubomir Zolotovich in his report from the end of January 1904.³¹

In England the emphasis was mainly on the cruelties on behalf of Ottoman authorities in suppressing the Ilinden-Preobrazhenie Uprising and on the danger of war conflict. These issues were discussed by the Chamber of Lords. On 3 February 1904, the diplomatic agent in the British capital Dimitar Tsokov sent an encoded telegram No.52 to the Bulgarian government. It was evident from it that the English foreign minister Lord Lansdowne completely shared these concerns. The question of the amnesty and of effective introduction of reforms was of primary importance for the British policy on the issue.³²

³² ЦДА, Микрофилми и копия на документи от Хувъровия архив на войната, мира и революцията, САЩ, 19-18, 2 л. бланка, препис. Публ. В Из тайния архив на българския цар

²⁹ CSA, fond 176 c, inventory 1, archival file 1856, pp. 34-38. V. Kitanov. Contribution to the Diplomatic History of Bulgaria. Grigor Nachovich and the Bulgarian-Turkish Agreement.. 85. ³⁰Tushe Vlahov... 82.

³¹ CSA, fond 176 c, inventory 1, archival file 1856, pp. 34-38. V. Kitanov. Contribution to the Diplomatic History of Bulgaria. Grigor Nachovich and the Bulgarian-Turkish Agreement, p. 85.

The diplomatic corps in Tsarigrad was also positive about the negotiations between the Principality and the Empire. On 14 February 1904, Prince Ferdinand's birthday, the Russian, German, French and other ambassadors in the Ottoman empire went to the Bulgarian mission to send their congratulations and shared their positive expectations about the agreement. Grigor Nachovich would write in a letter to Strashimir Dobrevich, secretary and head of the Secret Office of the castle in Sofia: "Our agreement with Turkey makes the best impressions here; not only ambassadors and ministers have changes their attitudes towards Bulgaria but you can see a new mood in relation to us in the population itself, in the ordinary clerks."³³

The Bulgarian government tried to guarantee international support by Austria-Hungary and Russia to apply the reform in Adrianople Thrace and the inclusion of the region in the agreement's scope. The result was a refusal by the two powers and their advice was not to insist on that matter anymore.³⁴ Bulgaria accepted these suggestions and thus created the impression it will be working in line with the common sense of European diplomacy. That was the line of political behaviour that Grigor Nachovich adhered to throughout the entire period of the negotiations.

The agreement concluded corresponded to the efforts of the great powers to overcome the danger of military conflict between the Principality and the Empire. The content of the agreement text synchronised the interests of the two Balkans states with the main requirements of European diplomacy. As it was pointed out, pursuant to point 1, the Bulgarian principality assumed the obligation not to admit on its territory to form revolutionary groups or to prepare and carry out activities directed against the Ottoman Empire. Thus, the ottoman party was satisfied. The request of the great powers that Bulgaria should refrain from intervention in European Turkey whish was expressed several times by Russia and Austria-Hungary was also satisfied. Point 3 and 4 of the agreement guaranteed amnesty for the political prisoners and gave the right to the refugees to return to their homes. In this case, the Bulgarian side was satisfied and another important condition of the great powers expressed in their conversations with Bulgarian diplomatic agents.

The concluding of the Bulgarian-Turkish agreement was accepted well by the great powers. Bulgarian diplomatic representatives carried out active propaganda campaign to enlighten public opinion in the relevant countries.³⁹

Фердинанд I. Документи за военната и политическата история на България, София, 2001, с. 81. (CSA, Microfilms and copies of documents from Hoover archive of war, peace and revolution, USA, 19-18, 2 p. template, transcript. Publ. in: From the Secret Archive of the Bulgarian king Ferdinand I. Documents about the Military and Political History of Bulgaria, Sofia, 2001, p. 81).

³³ CSA, fond 3 c, inventory 8, archival file 589, pp. 4-5. V. Kitanov. Contribution to the Diplomatic History of Bulgaria. Grigor Nachovich and the Bulgarian-Turkish Agreement... 99.

³⁴ CSA, fond 176 c, inventory 1, archival file 1856, pp. 79-80.

³⁵ B. Kesyakov.Op. Cit., pp. 22-24. V. Kitanov. Contribution to the Diplomatic History of Bulgaria. Grigor Nachovich and the Bulgarian-Turkish Agreement... 126-127.

³⁶ CSA, fond 3c, inventory 8, archival file 531, pp. 52-53. CSA, fond 176 c, inventory 1, archival file 1856, pp. 34-38.

³⁷ B. Kesyakov. Op. cit., pp. 22-24. V. Kitanov. Contribution to the Diplomatic History of Bulgaria. Grigor Nachovich and the Bulgarian-Turkish Agreement.. 126-127.

³⁸ CSA, fond 176 c, inventory 1, archival file 1856, pp. 34-38. V. Kitanov... 126-127.

³⁹ В. Китанов. Отзвукът от Българо-турското споразумение от 26 март 1904 г. в чужбина(по рапорти на българските дипломатически агенти в европейските столици). В: Научни

Conclusion

The treaty concluded solved a number of problems in a period critical for the Balkans and for the development of Macedonian Question. It remained known in history as the Bulgarian-Turkish Agreement. According to its clauses, the Bulgarian party undertook not to tolerate an open revolutionary movement in Macedonia and Adrianople Thrace. The empire government had to effect the Murzsteg reforms and agreed to amnesty the political prisoners and exiled people, as well as to cooperate in the returning of refugees.⁴⁰

The evaluation and analysis of the event performed provide the grounds for several conclusions marking the moments of contribution of the present research.

First of all, the article proves that the treaty actually constituted the first international recognition of Bulgaria as a party to the Macedonian Question. That was a convenient occasion for the principality to undertake commitments for its subjects in Ottoman European provinces. Throughout the following years the government in Sofia would try to affirm that position because it gave rise to its legitimate right to political, diplomatic or military intervention.

The diplomatic efforts of Grigor Nachovich led to normalizing the relations between the two countries and to solving a number of other important problems. As a result of the agreement, more than 4000 prisoners and exiled people were freed from the prisons in Thessaloniki, Skopje, Adrianople and Bitola, from the prisons and fortresses in Anatolia, Asia Minor and Africa where they were sent for their participation in the uprising activities against Ottoman power. A process of returning of the refugees to their home places in the Ottoman Empire also began and almost 30 000 people returned to Macedonia and Adrianople⁴¹ As a result of the clauses pertaining to the exiled and the refugees, in practice a considerable portion of the politically active population was preserved and at the same time, re-bulgarisation of parts of European Turkey took place in a way. That determines the second essential result from the agreement concluded.

The most important moment of contribution of the present research is that it proves the fact that the *Bulgarian-Turkish Agreement prevented the danger that arose in 1903 of the outburst of military conflict between the Ottoman Empire and the Principality of Bulgaria*. An evaluation like this, of course, should take into account the fact that the great powers were nt interested in an inter-country crisis in the Balkans. Russia was engaged in the war with Japan in the Far East, which broke out in February 1904. Austria-Hungary realized that it was not in the capacity to actually benefit from an eventual military conflict on the peninsula. Germany viewed the status-quo in the Balkans as a condition for affirmation of its economic presence in the Ottoman Empire. At the same time, historical

известия, г.І, кн.І, Югозападен университет "Heoфит Рилски", Благоевград, 2005, с. 317. (V. Kitanov. The Response to the Bulgarian-Turkish Agreement of 26 March 1904 Abroad (according to Reports of Bulgarian Diplomatic Agents in European Capitals). In: Scientific Proceedings, v. I, b. I, South-West University "Neofit Rilski", Blagoevgrad, 2005, p. 317).

⁴⁰ British Documents on the Origins of the War... 108-109.

⁴¹ В. Китанов. Мястото на българо-турското споразумение от 1904 г. в развитието на македонския въпрос. Пловдивски университет "Паисий Хилендарски", Философско-исторически факултет, Научни трудове, т. І, кн. 1, Пловдив, 2006, с. 293-301. (V Kitanov. The Place of the Bulgarian-Turkish Agreement of 1904 in the Development of the Macedonian Question. Plovdiv University "Paisii Hilendarski", Faculty of Philosophy and History, Scientific works, v. I, b. 1, Plovdiv, 2006, pp. 293-301).

sources conclusively prove that the agreement is a deed supported but not imposed or suggested from the outside against the will of the negotiating parties. That was the great merit of those political figures in Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire, which imposed peaceful solution regardless of the strong war-like sentiments in both countries.

For the European circles of authority, through the agreement *Bulgaria turned into a guarantor of giving effect to the Murzsteg Reforms*. That moved the country to a more reputable level than its neighbours Greece and Serbia in terms of the Macedonian Question.⁴²

The Bulgarian-Turkish Agreement justifies the understanding that war is not a goal in and of itself and demonstrates the maturity of the Balkan politician who can take nationally-responsible, politically right and historically justified decisions in difficult moments without being under the influence of emotions or revanchism.

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⁴² V. Kitanov. The Response to the Bulgarian-Turkish Agreement... 327.

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