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EDITORIAL**

PATTERNS OF RATIONALITY IN NORDIC LANGUAGE TEACHERS' VIEWS ON SECOND LANGUAGE

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Abstract

The purpose of the work is to investigate linguistic methods for detailed analyzes of rationality and to explore their usefulness, in this current study by analyzing how Nordic language teachers rationalize their views on second language The research methods consist of explorative qualitative analysis of focus group interviews by using linguistic markers of different rationality forms on a word level. The material consists of focus group interviews of second-language teachers in Finland, Denmark and Sweden. The result show that all interviewed teachers in the Nordic countries favored a monolingual view on second language learning, which is in opposition to the national curricula in one of the Nordic countries that advocates multilingualism, and in addition, despite that one of the countries has two national languages.

Keywords

Linguistic markers – Rationalization – Monolingualism – Multilingualism – Translanguaging

Introduction

Preface

This pilot study explores language teachers' views on second language in three countries, Finland, Denmark and Sweden and how these views are rationalised. The views are related to monolingualism, multilingualism and translanguaging. Teachers' views are analysed by departing from linguistic markers for different types of rationality forms and the patterns of these. Both the methodological and the empirical results are focused and discussed.

Purpose of the study

This study has two aims closely related to each other, one empirical and one methodological. The empirical aim is to study Nordic language teachers' views on migrant's second language learning and how these views are rationalized by the teachers themselves. The methodological objective is to explore how linguistic rationality markers on the word level can be used for mapping patterns of rationality and how these can be used for analyses of rationalizations.

Research Questions

What views on language and language teaching do the Nordic teachers have when discussing teaching migrants?

What choices of rationalizations do the teachers make when justifying their own views on second language teaching?

How can a methodology departing from linguistic markers be used for mapping patterns of rationality?

Background

In this chapter, we present some theoretical views on language learning and on rationality and truth. These views are used later as a departure in chapter 4 when we operationalise linguistic methods for analyses of rationality patterns.

Views on language learning

Monolingualism

There are different accounts of monolingualism. They are ranging from "a person who is able to speak and practice only one language and a community having command of only one language" to definitions saying that there "is not a single person in the world that is not acquainted with at least a rare word in languages other than the parental language"[1].

Monolingualism often contains views on language where languages are described as enumerable, translatable, and tied to nationhood[2]. The later tie between language and nationhood becomes visible in questions of citizenship and related to regulations and principles for acquiring citizenship, such as ancestry (jus sanguinis), territory (jus soli) and stay (jus domicile). This connection made between language and nationality is even more salient in regulations for acquiring citizenship such as a person's language proficiency and cultural knowledge[3]. Bacon[4] states that "Notions of citizenship have begun to shift from an emphasis on blood-rights and territorial rights toward a system in which demonstrated linguistic competency has become a key criterion of belonging". Language and citizenship are in this case also linking together monolingualism and nationalism. "Through the lens of citizenship, monolingualism not only impacts communication, but in the symbolic connection of language to nationhood. Thus, as nations today become more broadly diverse in terms of race, ethnicity, and national origin, language use becomes increasingly scrutinized and regulated as a vehicle for symbolic allegiance and purported social cohesion"[4]. Ellis[5] summarises three main perspectives on monolingualism. In the first perspective bilingualism and multilingualism are seen as an exception and monolingualism is the general rule. In the second perspective monolingualism is seen as a limitation on cognitive, communicative and social potential. The third perspective is even more critical against monolingual views and portray monolingualism as a pathological linguistic state, harmful for all language use and language users. Bacon[4] remarks however that "The monolingual view on language and language learning is in no way obsolete". This means that it is a part of common practice and a common view in language learning. In the monolingual view, the different languages compete with each other, and if used together by a single speaker there is a risk that they will contaminate each other. That is why they need to been learned separately and children should not mix languages because of the risk of only mastering half of each of the languages and mixing them making them difficult to use and understand. In this perspective, children mixing several languages run the risk of never developing a language suitable for thinking and talking on a higher level. The risk of mixing languages for the society is that people do not understand each other well enough and develop a weaker societal cohesion that threatens the effective organization of the society. The "one dominating language" policy is then seen as an important perquisite for the integration in the monolingual perspective.

Multilingualism

Multilingualism has both differences and similarities in relation to monolingualism. In a multilingual view of language, the individual speaker's languages are more than one, but they are still enumerable, unique systems that language users alternate between[6]. The different language systems influence on each other is more accepted than in monolingualism and different languages are seen both as enriching and not only as

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[2] C. K. Bacon, "Book Review: Gramling, David (2016). The invention of monolingualism. New York, New York: Bloomsbury Academic", EuroAmerican Journal of Applied Linguistics and Languages Vol: 5 num 1 (2018): 88-92.

[3] C. Von Post; P. Wikström; H. Räihä y V. Liubiniene, "Values and Attitudes of Nordic Language Teachers towards Second Language Education", Sustainable multilingualism num 10 (2017): 194-212.

[4] C. K. Bacon, Book Review: Gramling…

[5] E. Ellis, "Monolingualism: The unmarked case", Sociolinguistic Studies Vol: 7 num 2 (2007): 173-196.

[6] O. Garcia y L. Wei, Translanguaging Flerspråkighet som resurs i lärandet (Stockholm: Natur & Kultur, 2018).

competing in relation to each other. The different languages are seen as more equal in the speaker's private use of them but still not equal from the point of view of the society. The societal differences between languages are visible through terms like first and second language and minority language. One example of this is the Swedish national syllabus for second language. According to the Swedish National Agency of Education a multilingual perspective in teaching should be used. "A parallel development of the everyday and school language in the student's mother tongue/strongest school language and the new language provides the student with a good basis for understanding and learning to express a certain subject content. A student who already speaks a language other than Swedish should thus be encouraged to continue using and developing his/her mother tongue/strongest school language"[7]. But the view that one of the languages should be the main language as a society's "lingua franca", is still not challenged in the multilingual view. The languages are seen as different codes and altering between them is then consequently called code shift[6]. The focal point here is that the possibility of multilingual shift between a speakers' languages is located on the inner cognitive level, and at the same time keeping the definitions and national functions of languages separate. You could call this strategy as trying to both have your cake and eat it, that is, recommend the use of several languages simultaneously but giving them separated domains. The monolingual paradigm is still intact when it comes to the multilingual view on language as unique systems but the views on their simultaneous use are chancing to a more positive view. One of these is that it is possible for a person may have several mother tongues. The view of language learning is that the languages that are already learnt support learning of new languages. The mother tongues are seen as assets for learning new languages. From this multilingual perspective the above mentioned monolingualism can been seen as a limitation on the cognitive, communicative, social and vocational potential of a person[8].

Translanguaging

Translanguaging is a further step away from monolingualism than multilingualism. It is also a step from multilingualism to a unifying perspective on language use and language learning[6]. There are different definitions of translanguaging. According to Jaspers[9] these definitions include innate bilinguals' spontaneous language use, bilingual pedagogy, and to a theory of language and education. Translanguaging is however caught in a dilemma between, a) their emic amalgamating language learning view where all the individuals experiences of language are adding to one and the same non-hierarchical competence and where different language forms are only seen as effects of immediate contextual needs, and b) the need of conforming to the external view where languages are seen as separated entities, hierarchically ordered in monolingual views found in national school and language policies[10]. The advocates of translanguaging are also arguing for a new language teaching paradigm, the unrestricted use of all of a person's languages when learning a new language. This means including learners all linguistic recourses as equally important, without any linguistic hierarchies and without claiming the dominion of any language. In relation to the multilingualism, translanguaging is a later development that takes the idea of multilingualism one step further seeing the traditional monolingualism not

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[7] Swedish national agency for education. Retrieved from: https://www.skolverket.se/download/18.32744c6816e745fc5c31dab/1576841280026/artikel%203_Flerspra%CC%8Akiga_Kunskapsutvecklande.pdf

[8] E. Ellis, Monolingualism: The unmarked …

[9] J. Jaspers, "The transformative limits of translanguaging", Language & Communication num 58 (2018): 1–10.

[10] J. Jaspers, The transformative…

only as an obstacle but as a pathological linguistic state. Multilingualism is seen as a restricted precursor to translanguaging[11].

Rationality, truth and language

Forms of rationality and rationalisation

A common quest for rationality and reliability is a key feature of all language use[12]. It is no surprise that professional actors, such as teachers, try to avoid giving an expression of irrationality and unreliability. Teachers are also a professional group using language as their professional tool and concerned of how rational and reliable their use of language is perceived[13]. What is then rationality, rationalisation and rationality found in language itself? Let's first give some answers to the two former categories, rationality and rationalisation and return to the question of rationality in language in chapter 4. To begin with, there are different types of accounts of rationality and rationalisation. An example of the later is given by the Italian economist Pareto[14] who says that people are engaged in constant linguistic rationalisations of their actions in order to frame them as sensible and coherent. Pareto called these post hoc rationalisations for linguistic *derivations*, not entirely dissimilar to the mathematical term derivation. Parson[15] describes Pareto's approach to rationality as "theories of linguistic expressions involved in non-logical action. The term non-logical refers to actions that cannot be measured by using any objective means to ends logic. Pareto himself argues that it is not sufficient to depart from dichotomies such as *rational - irrational* to be able to give a fuller account of the rationality in people's actions[16]. An important type of rational action is the action that is characterised as non-rational, i.e. linguistic actions that cannot be assessed by using a simple means to ends logic as a yardstick. The assessment of rationality of social actions needs to include the actor's subjective perspectives and motives[16]. An important type of rationality found in all social actions is the subjectivity rationality including the person's feelings, experiences and intentions. This includes language-based derivations, which can be characterised as person's post hoc rationalizations, that is made in retrospect, by describing the world in such a manner that the person's actions can be understood as logical and reasonable. Pareto's account then adds linguistic subjectivity to the objective accounts of rationality. These post hoc rationalisations are actually very important types of actions holding the society together and adjusting people's social relations. Without this "socialising" function of post hoc rationalisations no other forms of rationality could be possible to sustain in a society[17]. Pareto maintains also that an expectation of objectivity in the social life is a reduction of the scope of rationality. This constant search for rationality is a key element in our accounts of reality and in our idealized expectations of rationality[16]. Social life is characterized by strong expectations of rationality in our actions, which means that we feel an obligation to construct our own and other people's actions as logical in order to meet

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[11] E. Ellis, Monolingualism: The unmarked …

[12] H. Garfinkel, A Conception of Experiments with "Trust" as a Condition of Stable Concerted Action. In: Harvey O. J. (ed.), Motivation and Social Interaction (New York: Ronald Press, 1963).

[13] H. Räihä, Lärares dilemman. Studier från Örebro i svenska språket 4 (Örebro: Örebro universitet, 2008).

[14] V. Pareto, The mind and society. A treatise on general sociology (New York: Dover Publications, 1966).

[15] T. Parson, The structure of social action (Illinois: The Free Press, 1967).

[16] V. Pareto, The mind and society…

[17] V. Pareto, Sociological Writings (Oxford: Blackwell, 1963).

common expectations. Rationalisations are an evidence of this and an empirical fact according to Pareto[16].

Pareto is not unique among theorists to give this kind of complex view of rationality with different domains and forms. Rationality forms are often called world outlooks or simply worlds. From the point of view of logics the term *world* refer to circumstances that make a proposition true and defining how these should look like to make what is said to be true[18]. The term *world* appears also in accounts of rationality made by Popper[19] who defines three such worlds and calls them; World 1: the physical world, World 2: the mental world and World 3: the theoretical world[20]. Garfinkel[21] includes an interpersonal form of rationality to these worlds, by listing social expectations that actors orient themselves towards. These expectations make up social criteria for assessments of the rationality of actions. Garfinkel[22] says that with the " preceded normality of events I refer to the perceived formal features that environment events have for the perceiver as instances of a class of events i.e., typicality; their "chances" of occurrence, i.e. likelihood; their comparability with past or future events; the conditions of their occurrences, i.e. causal texture; their place in a set of means-ends relationships, i.e. instrumental efficacy; and their necessity according to a natural or moral order, i.e. moral required-ness". An attempt to give an account of rationality in its different forms and in a way containing all the above-mentioned forms of rationality is Habermas[23] historical reconstruction of rationality in the western world. It contains categories like objective, subjective and intersubjective forms of rationality. He also makes a meta level distinction between perspectives on rationality namely the rationality found in steering *systems* of society with emphasis on objective rationality and system media (such as money) in contrast to *lifeworld* understood as mundane everyday life, with emphasis on linguistically mediated intersubjectivity rationality[24].

In his historical reconstruction of rationality forms Habermas[23] arrives to four main forms of rationality distinguished from each other. These are subjective rationality, intersubjective rationality, objective rationality and proper linguistic form. As we have already seen this is not an entirely new outlook in all its details, but a more comprehensive account compared with predecessors such as Popper[25], Carnap[26], Pareto[27] and Garfinkel[28].

Let's look at Habermas[29] scheme of rationality forms, presented in Figure 1.

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[18] R. Carnap, The Logical Structure of the World: Pseudoproblems Philosophy (Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969) y K. Popper, A pocket Popper (London: Fontana, 1983).

[19] K. Popper, A pocket Popper (London: Fontana, 1983).

[20] K. Popper, A pocket ...

[21] H. Garfinkel, A Conception of…

[22] H. Garfinkel, A Conception of…

[23] J. Habermas, Kommunikativt handlande (Göteborg: Daidalos, 1988).

[24] O.E. Eriksen, J. Weigård, Habermas politiska teori (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2000).

[25] K. Popper, A pocket...

[26] R. Carnap, Meaning and Necessity. A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic (London: The University of Chicago Press, 1970).

[27] V. Pareto, The mind and society…

[28] H. Garfinkel, A Conception of…

[29] J. Habermas, Kommunikativt handlande…

Reality domain	•Outer nature •Society •Inner nature •Language
Form of appearance	•Objectivity •Normativity •Subjectivity •Inter-subjectivity
Claim of validity	•Truth •Rightness •Truthfulness •Intelligibility
General function	•Formulation of facts •Interpersonal relations •Subjective experiences (Medium)

Figure 1
Forms of rationality, according to Habermas

The historical reconstruction makes Habermas scheme in some ways backwards compatible, but not in any immediate way because the forms reconstructed by Habermas include critics of the predecessors. Dews[30] states that in the case of Habermas "Critique seeks not to disprove other theories, but to establish the *limits* of their validity". These kinds of limits are also sought regarding the categories in Figure 1. There is however no room to explicate Habermas voluminous discussions about validity, reconstructions of rationalities and critics in this current paper. More detailed accounts can be found in Habermas[31,32] Theory of communicative action, volume 1 and 2. In this current paper we are focusing on the rationality forms and validity claims and these will be explicated more thoroughly in chapter 4.

Some examples of subjective, objective and intersubjective rationality

Emotions are closely connected to learning and rational thinking[33], and they are expressed in language as speaker's inner authentic experience[34]. If the truth of the occurrence of emotions and feelings would be questioned by the listener, then the authenticity of the linguistic expressions are at stake. The problem, seen from the objective point of view, is that it is difficult to present any hard evidence of subjective states of mind, for example feelings experienced during a dream. The only evidence that is socially relevant to require is the truthfulness and authenticity of the speaker expressed through use of language[34]. This means that regrading the subjective domains of rationality it is reasonable to emphasize the subjective forms of rationality and downplay the social role of

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[30] P. Dews, Habermas: A critical reader (Massachusetts: Blakwell, 1999), 4.

[31] J. Habermas, The theory of communicative action, vol: 1. Reason and the rationalization of society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984).

[32] J. Habermas, The theory of ...

[33] P. Frascà, "Rational, Emotional, Affective Learning" and the Use of Innovative Methods in Foreign Language Teaching", Nouvelle Revue Synergies Canada num 9 (2016): 2.

[34] J. Habermas, Kommunikativt handlande...

hard evidence and logical certainties. The speaker needs to communicate the subjectively experienced feelings in a way that makes them truthful and authentic to the listener. The authenticity of the linguistic expression is a typical case of the subjective rationality according to Habermas[34]. The empirical truth and logic, in turn, belong to the domains of objective rationality, a typical case in natural sciences and mathematics. These later forms of rationality are not tailored for the same communicative needs as the subjective form. This is the reason why demanding objective hard evidence of experiences during a dream is not a rationally valid demand. The objective form of rationality belongs (in a typical case) to another domain of knowledge, not comparable to the domain of subjectivity in any immediate way.

One of the conclusions is that if there are claims of a certain form rationality then the evidence, if in doubt, need to be consistent with the rationality form in the claim. If the rationality claim is subjective then evidence of rationality needs to be of the same type of rationality. As we have seen from the example of subjectivity in a dream, it is not rational to ask for objective proof of it. The conclusion is that different rationality forms cannot be lumped together in any simple way to form a monologic truth. Retelling a dream and constructing a building can both be considered as rational endeavours, but the typical forms used to assess their rationality are differentiated from each other and developed to their own specific rationality forms during the historical development[34]. We also need to say something about the third from of rationality, namely the intersubjective rationality considered as the centrepiece of Habermas[34] account of the development of the western rationality. The intersubjective rationality is the normative domain of the rationality, including collective norms, moral and ethics as a ground for claims of legitimacy. Legitimacy is grounded in people's lifeworld and it is also the base for legality (legitimacy's corresponding part on the system side). The intersubjective rationality is at the core of the rationality of groups and societies at the current level of cultural development in the western type of societies[34]. The later statement is important, showing the historical and sociocultural origin of rationality and downplaying the claims of universality of only one of the rationality forms. The most basic feature in the current developments of societies, according to Habermas[35] is the development of differentiated rationality spheres, or worlds, that is the lifeworld consisting of relations based on solidarity and everyday language use, and system consisting of institutions based on effectiveness of organisation organized through system media, such as money and administrative hierarchies. The development of these two spheres, their interaction, dynamics and sifting dominance can be seen as the driving force behind the differentiation of the rationality forms to subjective, intersubjective, objective and linguistic forms. This development can be described by making a distinction between systems instrumental rationality, a "means-ends" rationality, mediated by monological media such as money, time, and administrative hierarchies in opposition to communicative rationality, mediated by dialogic language use oriented to mutual mundane understanding. The relation between system media and mundane language use is both contradictory and complementary[36]. The cultural development can be described as ongoing differentiation of systems and mundane language and as colonisation of lifeworld by system. The forms of rationality developed are ways of making the world comprehensible and plausible for different types of joint action. Further accounts can be found in Habermas[35].

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[35] J. Habermas, Kommunikativt handlande...; H. Räihä, Lärares dilemman... y J. Habermas, The theory of…

[36] H. Räihä, Lärares dilemman...

Basic trust and truth

Two additional concepts closely related to the construction of rationality are *truth* and *basic trust*. *Basic trust* is our assumption that things are as they are expected to be, and that events are occurring and developing in the way we expect them to happen. Basic trust fills in the voids between our assumptions about future events and actions and the uncertainty of if the future will confirm our expectations[37]. In this perspective, we expect that societies, institutions and actors will be typically predictable, also in the future, even if we can't have any proof of it. There are for example no guarantees that the bus to the airport will arrive in time, but we assume it will, and plan our journey according to this unproved assumption. Also, the bus driver and the pilot share these kinds of assumptions and they will also do their best to confirm these expectations through their actions. Nevertheless, buses and flights are sometimes late, but our basic trust makes us still act as if they will be arriving in time, for example, we go to the bus stop according to the timetable. But of course, if they are late every time, we will adjust our behaviour, disappointed that the reality does not confirm to or earlier expectations. This kind of basic trust is entirely necessary for the function of groups and societies and the rational (trustworthy) actors feel that it is their obligation to conform these expectations by acting accordingly. These expectations are also foreseen in manipulative action, such as deliberately not telling the truth, or what is considered a truth from a certain point of view (more of this below). The rationality and credibility of the social actors is a prerequisite of coordination of collective action, not least on the institutional level[38]. It is then not surprising that mutually expected rationality, credibility, and sincerity of competent actors also make a cornerstone of professional action. Also, informal social contexts require rationality, credibility, and sincerity of its actors. In addition to external demands from other actors, groups and social institutions, individuals have strong inner motives for trying to live up to expectations of rationality, credibility and sincerity**¡Error! Marcador no definido.**. Another concept related to rationality is *truth.* It can also be seen from different perspectives. Carnap[39] shows that differences between synthetic and logical truth poses one of the problems to arriving at unison criteria for truth. The relation between synthetic and logical truth is however also more complicated than our short account is able to show. A short description of this relation is that logical truth can be seen as circular references within a system, i.e. a type of self-reference, while synthetic truth is a mixture of references that point both inwards to logical systems and outwards toward (corresponding) worlds outside. The question of correspondence is in itself a central question in scientific perspectives such as logical empiricism (see Carnap[39] for a discussion). Truth is then not any unitary concept. The later can be exemplified by following five theories of truth: correspondence, coherence, pragmatic, redundancy and deflation theory. The account below follows Slob[40]. The correspondence theory consists of two types, congruence and correlation. Congruence theory implies some kind of isomorphism between thought and the world of facts while the correlation theory states that this relationship is conventionally mediated. Correspondence theory binds theoretical statements to the world of outer reality. The coherence theory is about the validity of how new statements fit into previous

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[37] A. Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991).
[38] A. Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity… y H. Garfinkel, A Conception of…
[39] R. Carnap, Meaning and Necessity….
[40] W.H. Slob, Dialogical Rhetoric: An Essay on Truth and Normativity after Postmodernism (Dordrecht-Boston-London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002).

ones, while the truth criterion of pragmatic truth theory departs from utility of truth and the utility confirms the claims of

truth. Redundancy theory states that truth cannot be identified as a separate phenomenon but is simply already implied in what we perceive to be true, meaning that the truth thus adds very little to what we already know. Deflation theory in turn assumes that truth is not a characteristic of any phenomena and therefore simply does not exist[40]. According to Habermas[41] the differentiation of truth and rationality is closely related to the differentiation of society and social systems and the colonization of the mundane life world by steering systems. This differentiation of truth and rationality is also observable as increasing distance between medium for system steering such as money, time and administrative devises and their lifeworld counterpart the mundane language use. In this scenario the language-based rationality is losing domains to system media claiming effectivity as the societies dominating rationality form. At the same time language is the historical source of rationality and the system can be seen as a historical development of one form of the rationality potential of language. This means that the growth of systems and system media are depending of the rationality potential of language for their further expansion. In this respect rationality forms are relying on linguistic categories.

Methodology and material

The methodology regarding rationality analyses departs form a reorganisation of Habermas[42] categories in Figure 1 and from additions of some subcategories. This is done by distributing the rationality forms in to the two meta categories, lifeworld rationality (also called communicative rationality) and system rationality also called instrumental rationality by Habermas[42], giving us six tentative subcategories of rationality (see Figure 2 below). Since language will be the medium for communication of the rationality forms this leaves us with six subtypes articulated in language. Theses six subtypes of rationality are related to typical linguistic recourses at the word level, marking these rationality types. The last step of relating the subcategories of rationality to linguistic markers is done with the aid of analyses of rationality markers in Räihä[43] and system functional linguistics (about SFL, see Holmberg[44]) This kind of methodology is consistent with Vygotsky's notion on linguistic tools[45] and the monosemic notion that "starting from the utterance and explaining retrospectively the choices that are embodied - or 'realized'- in the utterance … is probably easier to grasp in practice, because we are starting at the concrete end, with an actual wording"[46]. The lexical level is then chosen for operationalisations of rationalities in this current paper, by the above-mentioned reasons.

The subcategories and their relations in Figure 2 are not intended to be exhaustive descriptions of the categories in Figure 1. All reorganisations that differ from Figure 1 (and the all linguistic operationalisations) are made by authors of this paper.

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[41] J. Habermas, Kommunikativt handlande...
[42] J. Habermas, Kommunikativt handlande...
[43] H. Räihä, Lärares dilemman...
[44] P. Holmber, A.-M. Karlsson, Grammatik med betydelse: en introduktion till funktionell grammatik (Uppsala: Hallgren & Fallgren, 2006).
[45] R. Säljö, Lärandets kulturella redskap (Stockholm: Norstedts akademiska förlag, 2005).
[46] R.A. Wishart, "Monosemy: A Theoretical Sketch for Biblical Studies", Biblical and Ancient Greek Linguistics num 7 (2018): 110.

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Rationality category	lifeworld forms	system forms
subjective rationality:	authentic/ expressive	cognition
intersubjective rationality:	legitimacy	legality
objective rationality:	syntheses	logic

Figure 2
Forms of rationality including sub-categories, a tentative scheme

All rationality forms are possible to express in an utterance and all forms can be claimed as valid even if some of them are emphasized and made salient[47]. The emphasis in the language can be identified by features such as stresses, reinforcements, repetitions, extensive elaborations, modal logical markers etc. The scheme above and the linguistic operationalisations of it will be exemplified more thoroughly during the analyses of the material.

Linguistic markers of rationalisations

Rationalisations are visible at word level as different choices of linguistic tools, for example connectors[48]. Logical and modal connectors constitute some of these resources for rationalization. If we compare the Nordic languages (the languages in the interviews) these markers have close functional equivalents. The linguistic markers in our analyses are identified at word level in interviews made in Swedish, Danish and Norwegian. The examples in this paper are translated to English by using functional equivalents of the markers. This kind of translation is also used when applying English-based grammar such as SFL for Swedish use (see Holmberg[49]). We are using the term "typical" in relation to the markers, meaning "not only" and remark that the marker, a word in this case, can have additional functions. Recognizing the different rationality forms as the use of specific

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[47] J. Habermas, Kommunikativt handlande…
[48] H. Räihä, Lärares dilemman...
[49] P. Holmber, A.-M. Karlsson, Grammatik med betydelse...

linguistic tools makes it possible to see these as markers of rationality, opening a pathway to language-based rationality analyses of many (if not all) activities that language is a constitutive part of.

Logical markers: Some of the linguistic markers of rationality are logical markers[50]. These are easy to relate to traditional accounts of logics. A logical rationalization is marked by words such as *and*, *or*, *if*, *then* and *else*. They are then typical linguistic tools for constructing logical connections and are used to construct logical coherence in utterances, that is explicating how things and events are connected and related to each other. They are typically used to construct the world in a logically coherent manner.

Predicative markers: Some other examples of rationality markers are predictive markers such as *all, everyone, none, never, the same, equal* etc. These kinds of markers show how the world is predictable and generalizable[50]. Some of these, namely negations such as *not*, have obligatory presuppositions. Predicative markers are typically used for constructing predictability in conjunction to logical and other markers. They are also a precondition for falsification through counter evidence. Popper[51] reminds us that there are only conditions for falsification and no empirical proof will be adequate for verification. The claim that all swans are white only needs one counter evidence to falsify it, namely a black swan. But we can newer prove empirically that swans are black or white, no matter how many of them we observe, because there may be others that we haven't seen yet. The predicative linguistic markers convey and predict these kinds of conditions for falsification.

Modality, reinforcement and value markers: Modality markers are such as *perhaps, surely, apparently*, value markers such as *good, bad* and markers of collective norms such as *of course*, *still*, *in fact*, *already*. There are also reinforcements such as *very, a little, extremely* and alike. Modality markers regulate the speaker's relationship to the listener and the likelihood and certainty about what is asserted (see Räihä[50], Holmberg[52]).

Markers of rationality domains: There are linguistic processes marking different domains of reality which are closely connected to forms of rationality. These kinds of markers of reality domains can be found in categories of SFL, Systemic functional Linguistics (see Holmberg[52]) coding reality domains. Examples below follow Räihä[53] with slight modifications. In a sentence such as "Pjotr *plays* football." the process *plays* marks a material domain of rationality. In "Pjotr *thinks* about football." the process *thinks* marks a mental domain. In "Pjotr *tells* about the match" the process *tells* marks a verbal domain. In "Pjotr *is* a football player." the process *is* marks a relational domain. These examples are shown for heuristic purposes and the list is not exhaustive.

Clusters of markers of the same rationality form: Previous research[53] has shown that clusters of several markers of the same sort of rationality are occurring when people are dealing with risks, dilemmas and paradoxes but despite of this need to give a trustworthy professional impression, for example when teachers are talking with parents about their children's problems that happens to be especially sensitive[53]. The clusters of rationality forms emerge when a speaker need to construct demanding rationalizations in

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[50] H. Räihä, Lärares dilemman...
[51] K. Popper, A pocket ...
[52] P. Holmber, A.-M. Karlsson, Grammatik med...
[53] H. Räihä, Lärares dilemman...

real-time, for example in conjunction to problems where a teacher needs to rationalize not only their own but also the other participants actions (see examples in Räihä[53]).

Complex clusters: Same as above but with difference that the linguistic rationality markers belong to different rationality forms.

Research Methods

The material consists of interviews made of three focus groups in Sweden, Denmark and Finland. All interviews are recorded, and each focus group consists of three participants, including the interviewer. The length of each interview is around 45 minutes. The interviews are analysed qualitatively. In the first step we relate the content of utterances made by the interview persons to three views on second language and language learning, these are monolingualism, multilingualism and translanguaging. A total of 132 utterances are analysed. In the second step we make further analysis of the utterances related to the views by analysing linguistic markers of rationality forms. Four examples from each country are selected to illustrate the second step analyses. These twelve examples are also commented to clarify how the analyses are done.

Findings

In this chapter we are going to analyse examples from three focus group interviews. The analyses illustrate the mapping of the linguistic markers of rationality. The intention is not to make exhaustive analyses but only to show some telling examples. The explications of the first examples are more extended for the sake of clarity.

Swedish teachers

The Swedish teacher's utterances only contain examples of monolingualism. There are no examples of translanguaging and multilingualism. We analyse four illustrative examples of them below.

Now let's look more closely at four examples of utterances made by the Swedish teachers.

Example 1

Google translate <u>is</u> usable for translation <u>if</u> it <u>does</u> <u>not</u> stay in the way of assessment of the proficiency in Swedish

Markers	*(lifeworld)*	*(system)*
Subjective rationality claims:	authentic expressive	cognitive
Intersubjective rationality claims:	normative legitimacy	legality
Objective rationality claims:	synthetic	logic
	is	*if, not*

The rationality markers analysed are *is*, *if* and *not*. They belong to the objective from of rationality. The process, *is,* is a synthetic existential marker, stating that Google

translate is usable for translation. The marker *is*, is synthetic because both the existence of Google translate, and its usability are claimed to exist, and expected to be empirically verifiable in some way. The verifiability is not of the type of logical necessity (logic claim), but empirical (synthetic claim). The logical marker, *if,* is adding a conditional restriction for the usability of Google translate.

Thus, it is a marker of a logical form of objective rationality. The negation *not* is a logical predicative marker (*not stay in the way of assessment*). This means that to be sure if Google translate stays in the way or not, needs to be checked, since there is no logical necessity that it will. The negation *not* has a logical presupposition. The presupposition is that Google translate can stay in the way of assessment, otherwise there would be no point in making the objection of this possibility. The markers analysed in this utterance then makes a claim of objective rationality. However, the objective proof needed is not given. The utterance is not either followed by other utterances that could satisfy the claims made for objective rationality.

Example 2

Learning Sami <u>is</u> <u>not</u> beneficial <u>when</u> compared to learning Swedish

Markers	*(lifeworld)*	*(system)*
Subjective rationality claims:	authentic expressive	cognitive
Intersubjective rationality claims:	normative legitimacy	legality
Objective rationality claims:	synthetic	logic
	is	***not, when***

The rationality markers analysed are *is*, *not* and *when*. They belong to the objective from of rationality. The process, ***is***, is an existential synthetic (see above) marker denying that Sami is beneficial. The negation *no* is a logical predicative marker (see above) belonging to the objective form of rationality. The logical presupposition is that that Saami could give some benefits and it is this presupposition that is negated. *When* is a logical marker, comparable to *if* in the former example above. It introduces a condition that what is said applies in comparison with the Swedish. This provides a hypothetical prospect for comparisons with other languages with other results. The markers analysed in this utterance are claiming objective rationality.

Example 3

<u>For</u> their own <u>good</u> it <u>is</u> <u>best</u> to learn Swedish, Sami <u>is</u> <u>not</u> <u>sufficiently</u> widespread

Markers	*(lifeworld)*	*(system)*
Subjective rationality claims:	authentic expressive	cognitive
Intersubjective rationality claims:	normative legitimacy	legality
	good, best, sufficiently	
Objective rationality claims:	synthetic	logic
	is	***for, not***

The rationality marker analysed are *good, best, sufficiently, for, not, is, is.* We have two synthetic markers *is*. The synthetic existential claim is that it *is* best to learn Swedish given that Sami *is* not sufficiently widespread. The objective strategy is also backed up by the logical markers, *for* and *not.* The logical marker *for* is a marker of the intension behind learning Swedish, *for their own good.* The logical predicative marker *no* is denying the possibility of Sami being sufficiently widespread.

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The presupposition that *no* is objecting against, is that Sami could be sufficiently widespread. There is also a silent implication that a language needs to be widespread to be for the good of learners. In addition to objective rationality claims there are also three normative value claims, *good, best, sufficiently* used to legitimate a certain choice. They all are in different ways claiming the utility of learning Swedish. The marker *good* points out a normative claim that the learning of Swedish is for the good of the learners. The claim marked through *best* is emphasizing the best option for the learners, that is to learn Swedish. The normative marker *sufficiently* is pointing out that a language must be widespread enough to be a good choice. The intersubjective rationality claims are then asserting what is *best*, *sufficiently* and *good* in the everyday lifeworld. One of these claims is based on a common knowledge that Saami is not widespread, but Swedish is. The intersubjective lifeworld rationality, common mutual knowledge, is claimed here.

Example 4

S<u>ounds</u> <u>really</u> <u>awkward</u> that migrants wish to <u>learn</u> Swedish, <u>hard</u> to <u>know</u> why it <u>is</u> <u>allowed</u> in Finland, <u>if</u> you ask me

Markers	*(lifeworld)*	*(system)*
Subjective rationality claims:	authentic expressive	cognitive
	really	***Sounds, learn, wish,***
Intersubjective rationality claims:	normative legitimacy	legality
	hard awkward	***allowed***
Objective rationality claims:	synthetic	logic
	is	***if***

We identify nine markers. Five of these belong to subjective form, *really, sounds, learn, wish, know,* three to intersubjective, *awkward, hard* and *allowed* and two to objective form *is if*. This utterance has then markers of all analysed rationality forms in our scheme. If we start the explication by looking at the subjective rationality form claiming authenticity and expressivity, we have said earlier that it can be satisfied if the inner world of the speaker is expressed rather than giving a description of it. This time we have *really* that is marking the attitude (see also Holmberg[54]). The subjective claims on the system side are *sounds, learn, wish, know.* These are descriptions of inner states of mind such as intentions, *wish,* perceptions, *sounds,* and achievements *learn* and *know.* The intersubjective markers are, *awkward*, *hard* and *allowed* where *hard* is a claim about the certainty about what is asserted, making it a marker of intersubjective legitimacy while *allowed* is a marker of what is allowed and not allowed, making it a legality marker and *awkward* marks the deviation from expected normality. There is also an objective synthetic marker *is* and an objective logic marker *if.* The rationality markers in this utterance are pointing towards claims of subjectivity, *sounds really awkward*, inter-subjectivity, *hard, allowed*, and objectivity, *is, if*. The most visibly salient rationality claim is the subjective claim marked by six different markers and containing a cluster of three markers, *sounds*

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[54] P. Holmber, A.-M. Karlsson, Grammatik med...

really awkward. The subjectivity is maintained through claiming a logical premise, *if* (*you ask me*)*.* The synthetic marker *is* points out the claim that it is allowed to learn Swedish as second language in Finland. This is an empirical claim, that is, if doubted, in need of empirical proof.

The current utterance in favour for monolingualism is then rationalized by putting an emphasis on the subjective rationality, that is, by claims of expressivity of certain feelings and descriptions of inner mental states. The speaker's surprise of the existence of multilingualism in Finland is rationalised with linguistic means of subjectivity.

Danish teachers

The Danish teacher's utterances only contain examples of monolingualism. There are no examples of translanguaging and multilingualism. We analyse four illustrative examples of them below.

Example 5

I <u>have to</u> say about my group that I do <u>not</u> <u>know</u> what <u>is</u> the background of my participants

Markers	*(lifeworld)*	*(system)*
Subjective rationality claims:	authentic expressive	cognitive
		know
Intersubjective rationality claims:	normative legitimacy	legality
	have to	
Objective rationality claims:	synthetic	logic
	is	***not***

There are markers of three rationality forms identified. One of these is the claim of legitimacy, *have to,* that marks the intersubjective obligation to describe things as they are. Saying *I have to say* acknowledges this normative social obligation and conforms to it. The marker *is* points out the existence of a certain background of the participants by claiming the synthetic form of objectivity. We can also identify a logic form of rationality *not,* including a presupposition saying that it is possible to know about the backgrounds of pupils. The logical marker *not*, is then stating that this possibility is not used by the teacher.

Example 6

It <u>is</u> <u>very</u> <u>valuable</u> that you <u>try</u> to speak Danish in the workplace and <u>generally</u> in your life

Markers	*(lifeworld)*	*(system)*
Subjective rationality claims:	authentic expressive	cognitive
	very	***try***
Intersubjective rationality claims:	normative legitimacy	legality
	valuable	
Objective rationality claims:	synthetic	logic
	is	***generally***

One of the rationality markers is the synthetic existential marker *is*. The marker *generally* is a predicative marker making the world predictable through generalising. In this case the expectation is to speak Danish *generally (in your life).* Intersubjective norms and values are marked by *valuable*.

The subjectivity marker *very* is pointing out the attitude and upgrading the value of trying to speak Danish. There is also the subjective cognitive *try,* marking a state of mind, an intention to do something, in this case *try to speak Danish*.

Example 7

Integration <u>is</u> <u>then</u> that you <u>not</u> <u>only</u> work <u>but</u> that you speak Danish

Markers	*(lifeworld)*	*(system)*
Subjective rationality claims:	authentic expressive	cognitive
Intersubjective rationality claims:	normative legitimacy	legality
Objective rationality claims:	synthetic	logic
	is	***then, not, only, but***

All the rationality markers analysed are objective. The rationalisation in this utterance is then made by relying on the objective rationality. We have the existential synthetic objective marker *is*, pointing out what integration is. There are also four logical markers *then, not only, but.* Two of these appear as a cluster *not only.* The marker *then* indicates a logical relationship between integration, working and speaking Danish. The cluster *not only* consists of two predicative markers. *Not* is denying the possibility of *only working* as a sufficient condition for integration and *only* restricts the alternatives to work. The integration is rationalised to be a part of a predictable and logical world.

Example 8

In Denmark you <u>must</u> <u>know</u> the language and that <u>is</u> how it <u>is</u>

Markers	*(lifeworld)*	*(system)*
Subjective rationality claims:	authentic expressive	cognitive
		know
Intersubjective rationality claims:	normative legitimacy	legality
	must	
Objective rationality claims:	synthetic	logic
	is, is	

The intersubjective obligation is marked by *must.* The knowledge of language marked by *know* as a cognitive accomplishment is framed as an obligatory requirement in Denmark by the marker *must*. The two synthetic objectivity markers *is* and *is* make a claim of existence of this obligation by adding *and that is how it is.*

Finnish teachers

The Finnish teacher's utterances only contain examples of monolingualism. There are no examples of translanguaging and multilingualism. We analyse four illustrative examples of them below.

Example 9

> **For an ordinary person it <u>is</u> <u>probably</u> Finnish that applies <u>because</u> society here uses Finnish**

Markers	*(lifeworld)*	*(system)*
Subjective rationality claims:	authentic expressive	cognitive
Intersubjective rationality claims:	normative legitimacy	legality
	probably	
Objective rationality claims:	synthetic	logic
	is	**because**

The rationality markers in this utterance are synthetic objective *is,* logic objective *because* and intersubjectively legitimizing *probably.* By using *is* as a marker a claim is made that it is possible to prove empirically that Finnish is used in the Finnish society. There is also an additional marker for objectivity, namely the logical marker *because.* It contributes to the logical structure of the argument *because society here uses Finnish.*

Example 10

> **It <u>is</u> <u>possible</u> in <u>some</u> regions to manage with <u>only</u> Swedish <u>but</u> <u>then</u> it <u>is</u> the Ostrobothnia that applies**

Markers	*(lifeworld)*	*(system)*
Subjective rationality claims:	authentic expressive	cognitive
Intersubjective rationality claims:	normative legitimacy	legality
	possible, some	
Objective rationality claims:	synthetic	logic
	is, is	**only, but, then**

There are two synthetic objective markers *is is,* three logical objective markers *only, but, then,* and also two intersubjectively legitimating markers *possible, some.* The two synthetic objective markers *is* make an empirical claim that there are regions with only Swedish and that Ostrobothnia is one of these. Two of the logical claims *but* and *then* add restrictive conditions that are expected to be fulfilled. Also logical, but in a predictive sense, is the marker *only.* It serves the logical structure making the claim possible to falsify with only one counter example. Note however also that this counter example can be, but doesn't need to be, empirical. That is the reason why *only* is classified as logical and not synthetic. It is also emphasising a monolingual view, *only Swedish.* The markers making the statement more intersubjectively safe, are *possible* and *some.* They imply that there could be other options and you can't be too sure.

Example 11

> **<u>If</u> you <u>are</u> looking for a job, in <u>most</u> workplaces here you <u>must</u> be able to speak Finnish**

Markers	*(lifeworld)*	*(system)*
Subjective rationality claims:	authentic expressive	cognitive
Intersubjective rationality claims:	normative legitimacy	legality

	most, must	
Objective rationality claims:	synthetic	logic
	are	*if*

There are two markers of objective rationality claims *are* and *if,* and two normative intersubjective claims, *most* and *must.*

The synthetic and logical claims have already been exemplified several times. It suffices to say that *if* is marking a conditional logical claim of a perspective of those *looking for a job* while it is a synthetic existential claim of the existence of content of the conditional, both *you* and the activity of *looking for a job.* Important however to note is that the conditional *if* is stating a logical relation between *looking for a job* and *be able to speak Finnish.* It doesn't satisfy, or say anything, about the need of empirical proof of the existence claimed by *are.* The marker most points out the intersubjective (interpersonal in systemic-functional linguistics (SFL)) rationality claim of legitimacy of the utterance by reducing the generalization claims, that is *some* (instead of all or none). The marker of an intersubjective normative claim *must* points towards an (deontological) obligation to be able to speak Finnish. It both highlights the monolingual perspective and rationalises it as an intersubjectively obligating imperative.

Example 12

Here in the Helsinki region there <u>are</u> <u>very few</u> opportunities to speak Swedish <u>because</u> Finnish <u>is</u> the language used

Markers	*(lifeworld)*	*(system)*
Subjective rationality claims:	authentic expressive	cognitive
	very	
Intersubjective rationality claims:	normative legitimacy	legality
	few	
Objective rationality claims:	synthetic	logic
	are, is	*because*

The two synthetic claims are marked by *are* and *is.* The first of these objective synthetic markers *are* claims the existence of *Helsinki region* and *opportunities to speak Swedish* and the second *is* claims *Finnish* as *the language used.* The objective logic claim *because* marks a causal relationship between the *opportunities to speak Swedish* and *the language used* that is *Finnish.* A subjective authenticity marker is *very* pointing out the speaker's attitude to the intersubjective marker *few* and the claim of *few opportunities.* The subjective marker *very* is upgrading the interpersonal claim *few* by a claim of subjectivity. As we said earlier the markers *very few* can be seen as a complex cluster.

Intersection of views on language and the rationalization of the view

In the Figure 3 below we relate views on language to the rationalisations made of these views in our analyses of the utterances above.

The view on language Rationalization	Monolingualism	Multilingualism	Translanguaging
Subjective rationality			

Danish teachers	Varies	No	No
Finnish teachers	Varies	No	No
Swedish teachers	Varies	No	No
Intersubjective rationality			
Danish teachers	Varies	No	No
Finnish teachers	Varies	No	No
Swedish teachers	Varies	No	No
Objective rationality			
Danish teachers	Sustained	No	No
Finnish teachers	Sustained	No	No
Swedish teachers	Sustained	No	No

Figure 3
Summary of analyses

Figure 3 above gives us answers to our first two questions about what views on language and language teaching the Nordic teachers have when discussing learning and teaching second language and what choices of rationalizations the teachers make when justifying their views. The figure demonstrates clearly which of the three perspectives on language learning was rationalized as the most appropriate by the Nordic second language teachers, namely the monolingual view.

Regarding the rationalizations made by the teachers, examples of all the three main forms of rationality; subjective, intersubjective and objective, was found. But the only form sustained in all the analysed utterances is the objective form while the other forms varied. The objective rationality markers also represent more than half of all markers.

These results suggest a sustained rational relation between monolingual view and objective rationality in teachers' rationalisations.

Discussion

Views on second language

The results regarding the interviewed teachers' views on second language in this study are clear. All teachers in all surveyed countries prefer the monolingual view. This includes all utterances in or material, also those that were not selected to step two. These results are surprising since for example the Swedish national syllabus for second language learning advocates multilingualism and inter-culturalism, that is the opposite to monolingualism. The multilingual perspective prescribed in the Swedish national curriculum could then be a more expected outcome in case of professional teachers, stating the active use of all languages. Also surprising is that the Finnish teachers preferred monolingualism as a perspective on learning and teaching Swedish in Finland. This is surprising because Finland is a multilingual country where both Finnish and

Swedish are national languages. The Finnish teachers' views could be seen as a case of parallel or dual monolingualism. The results showing that all interviewed teachers preferred monolingualism are interesting but not possible to explain in this current pilot study. Our results are in need to be verified in a larger survey and if they are corroborated also in need of explanations.

Linguistic markers of rationality and patterns of rationality

The methodological results suggest that the monolingual view on language is typically (meaning not solely) rationalized by using objective rationality claims, that also are connected to the monological truth, while the other claims, subjective and intersubjective seems to be optional for the monolingual view. This is perhaps our most interesting methodological result so far. The emphasis on objective rationality forms used for rationalizing (claiming validity of) the monolingual view on language and learning is also theoretically consistent with the view of languages as self-contained externally observable systems. These results are also in accordance with the contrast between the external (objective) monolingual view and the internal (subjective) view of translanguaging. The results then suggest then that there are both empirical and theoretical implications of consistencies between rationality forms and the language views claimed as valid. The consistency is visible in Figure 3 as a tendency of sustaining the same rationality form in conjunction with the same view. This seems to be the case in several utterances despite that these are made by professionals in different countries.

The consistency between rationality forms and views claimed valid, together with the possibility to map this consistency by using linguistic markers seems like a promising methodology. But it is in need of further evidence in larger studies. If the results in this pilot study should be corroborated in larger studies, then language based analyses of rationality are useful for qualitative and quantitative (computer aided) analyses of rationality patterns and for further testing of conditions for specific rationality patterns to emerge.

The patterns of rationality markers could be useful for predictions based on expected and unexpected rationality patterns. This would be especially effective for analysing large corpuses of material and for categorizing rationality domains, such as subjective experiences, norm-related arguments and empirical statements. The analyses of rationality patterns could also serve as additional tools in online search engines providing the possibility of using rationality forms as selection criteria for rational consistency. The possibility of real time search and categorising of rational consistency in written and spoken language could be a useful tool for example in courtrooms, businesses, political rhetoric and other contexts where the rationality consistency is at stake.

Because of the size of this pilot study its results needs to be corroborated and the suggested methodology developed further through larger studies.

Conclusion

The current study shows that detailed analyses of rationality in communicative action can be made by using linguistic markers on the word level. The six rationality forms expressed in language, found in this study, are subjective expressiveness and cognition, intersubjective legitimacy and legality, objective logic and syntheses. The linguistic markers found useful for coding these rationality forms are logical markers, predicative

markers, modality markers, value markers, reinforcement markers, markers of reality domains, clusters and complex clusters. The operationalization of rationality forms demonstrates both some novel methodological possibilities and practical use of multidisciplinary research by linking social science theories with theories of language. The novelty and usefulness of this linking is illustrated by detailed analyses of how Nordic language teachers rationalize their views on language and second language learning in

interviews. The view preferred by the teachers when choosing between monolingualism, multilingualism and translanguaging, is monolingualism. The latter view is rationalized by the teachers by using objective rationality forms, related to monological truth. Teachers' preference for the monolingual view is rationalized by claims of objective rationality in utterances in favor of the monolingual view. The empirical results from the rationality analyses suggest that the views rationalized (monolingualism in this case), and the patterns of corresponding rationality emerging in rationalizations (objective rationality forms in this case) implicate each other. These results are also consistent with the contrast between the (objective) external monolingual view and the (subjective) internal view of translanguaging. The general conclusion is then that the consistencies between rationality patterns and the views rationalized are not restricted for analyses of rationality but also allow certain predictions of expected rationality forms in different views. Linguistic markers of rationality could therefore be useful, for example in software for identifying expected and unexpected patterns of rationality in recordings in courtrooms, businesses, political rhetoric and so forth. A more extensive study is however needed to develop the methodology further.

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